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BOOK REVIEWS.
By J. Malcolm Smith and CorWashington, D. C.: Public Affairs Press, 19Q0. Pp.

POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT DURING CRISES.

nelius P. Cotter.
viii, 184, $5.00.

As the title accurately indicates, the book deals with the broad and
loosely-defined topic of "crises" rather than being restricted to the more
narrow concept of "emergency power of the President", with which
most Americans have had direct contact during the recent depressions
and armed conflicts involving the United States.
The sphere of investigation presented by the authors concerns the
right and the duty of a nation-state to protect itself as a political entity
and the well-being of its citizenry, during a period of emergency in a
fashion consistent With constitutional guarantees. Thus, the problem
running throughout the book involves the basic question: "Is the United
States Constitution a rigid unyielding document, or, on the other hand,
can it be conceived of as a flexible instrument allowing the Executive
Branch all of the power and authority actually required-even if dictatorial and contra to individual rights and freedoms-to meet the
This use of executive
emergency in order to preserve the nation?"
power in our present system is termed "constitutional dictatorship."
Actually, the strongest examples of such executive rule can be found in
the war powers utilized on several occasions in the present century. As
stated in the "Forward" by Robert S. Rankin:
The use of emergency power in a democracy raises many questions relative to the constitutional basis for its authorization and
the manner of its exercise. If used too little and too late a democratic state might be destroyed when the proper use of the emergency power possibly could have saved it. If used arbitrarily and
capriciously, its use could degenerate into the worst form of dictatorship (p. v).
However, while Smith and Cotter contend that the use of such
emergency powers by the Chief-Executive was contemplated and provided for in the Constitution, they rightly maintain that at the present
time such powers are conferred by a disorganized mass of individual
statutes passed to meet specific problems, resolutions of Congress (joint
and concurring), and utilization of the President's inherent and "implied" powers, rather than an all-embracing statutory framework con-
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taining definite safeguards and procedures established under which
emergency actions may be terminated as quickly as possible when conditions have returned to normalcy. Such definite recommendations are
offered in the Concluding Chapter (Chapt. IX).
The book accepts the basic premise, which would not be open to
serious dispute at the more extreme levels, that any democratic government must be able to react to the extent required in order to meet any
serious crises; nevertheless, the problem concerns the extent of such authority. Accordingly, they state the issue as follows:
How can a virtually unlimited emergency power and a systematic
body of constitutional limitations upon government action logically
coexist? How can constitutionalism be ought but an anachronism
in the twentieth century unless constitutional governments are
equipped with adequate legal authority to carry the body politic
through economic and military emergencies of staggering dimensions
(p. 2) P
In Chapter II, "The Concept of Emergency In Democratic Political
Thought" the authors state their aim in writing the book, which is
merely to present a complete survey of the existing federal legislation
on the statute books and a summary of "assumed Presidential powers"
as yet unchallenged in the courts. In other words, the purpose of this
volume is to:
review the work of the Supreme Court in assessing the validity of
governmental exercises of emergency powers .

.

. and, in conclu-

sion, to submit tentatively an approach to emergency which they
consider related to the needs of today and the realities of recent
experience (p. 5).
In this chapter, in reality a historical and theoretical discussion of
the democratic political theories that have influenced our governmental
leaders, the positions of such men as John Locke, Rousseau, John Stuart
Mill, and Machiavelli are briefly analyzed.
Finally, the Chapter is
concluded with a significant sub-section entitled "Contemporary Theories" containing a discussion of some main standards employed in
the exercise of emergency power at the present time, including the
position of Clinton L. Rossiter,2 who sets forth the conditions required
I In addition, the thought is advanced: "An effort is made below to distinguish
between those who mean dictatorship when they say dictatorship, and those who
say dictatorship when they mean to refer to any effort by constitutional government to respond adequately to emergency conditions" (p. 8).
2 ConstitutionalDictator8hip (1948) 288ff.
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for success in a "constitutional dictatorship ".3 It is significant to note
the high degree of similarity between these theories of Rossiter and
the proposals advanced by the writers at the conclusion of the book
(Supra). The basic position of the authors is stated in the concluding
paragraph of the Chapter as follows:
[E]mergency governance is one form of an acute and continuing
problem in modern constitutional democracies: that of allotting increasing areas of discretionary powers to the executive, while insuring that such powers will be exercised with a sense of political
responsibility and under effective limitations and checks. In time
of emergency, governmental action may vary in breadth and intensity from more normal times, yet it need not be less constitutional. In time of war as in peace government responsible to the
orderly procedure of the la*w, and government responsible to the
governed, has proven its ability to meet the needs imposed by the
accelerated tempo and the growing complexity of the twentieth century (p. 13).
Chapters II through IX contain the factual data of the publication;
for a very systematic presentation-involving numerous sub-headings
and italicized key phrases-in which the various categories of crises, such
as depressions, inflation, strikes, housing, agricultural commodities,
drought, famine, etc., are presented along with an exhaustive explanation of the statutory legislation too extensive to cover in this brief review. Unfortunately, the numerous footnote references containing a
3 "1. No general regime or particular institution of constitutional dictatorship
should be initiated unless it is necessary or even indispensable to the preservation
of the state and Its constitutional order . . . 2.....
the decision to institute
a constitutional dictatorship should never be in the hands of the man or men who
will constitute the dictator . . . 3. No government should initiate a constitutional
dictatorship without making specific provision for its termination . . . 4.....
all uses of emergency powers and all readjustments in the organization of the
government should be effected in pursuit of constitutional or legal requirements
. .....
no dictatorial institution should be adopted, no right invaded, no
regular procedure altered any more than is absolutely necessary for the conquest
of the particular crisis . . . 6. The measures adopted in the prosecution of a
constitutional dictatorship should never be permanent in character or effect . . .
7. The dictatorship should be carried on by persons representative of every part
of the citizenry interested in the defense of the existing constitutional order . . .
8. Ultimate responsibility should be maintained for every action taken under a
constitutional dictatorship . . . 9. The decision to terminate a constitutional
dictatorship, like the decision to institute one, should never be in the hands of the
man or men who constitute the dictator . . . 10. No constitutional dictatorship
should extend beyond the termination of the crisis for which it was instituted . . .
11. . . . the termination of the crisis must be followed by as complete a return as
possible to the political and governmental conditions existing prior to the initiation of the constitutional dictatorship
."
Rossiter, Ibid., 298-306 cited by
Smith and Cotter at 10-11.
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large amount of additional data are all contained in the back of the
volume, with the effect that the reader is confronted with some difficulty
in exhaustively reading the book. It is submitted, therefore, that such
footnoting is a "fundamental right of authors and publishers" that
could well be suppressed.
In particular, the main economic divisions presented in Chapter III
include "Economic Emergencies", "Emergencies By National Catastrophies", and "National Security Emergencies". The value of this Chapter
lies in the fact that existing legislation in the areas of economic, monetary, and fiscal control are brought together.
Chapter IV "Emergency Powers Over Persons" is, in the opinion of
the reviewer, the most significant portion of the work for the reason that
the protection of individual constitutional rights is much more fundamental than the preservation of vested property interests. Undoubtedly,
the reader will recall the experiences of World Wars I and II and the
recent flood of legislation attempting to control subversion during the
present decade. Moreover, the authors present considerable statutory
authority, arising in the 1930's, for controlling individual activity and
freedom of choice. For example, control of: reserve units of the armed
forces and the National Guard, the civilian labor force, essential defense
and civilian production and services, persons possessing particular vital
skills, etc., is cited. It must be borne in mind, however, that the areas
of control are exercised in periods of "crises," that according to the
writers, is a situation much less than one involving "emergency," "national emergency," or "state of war."
The sub-section dealing with "Negative Integration" containing such
topics as "Preventive Detention" of aliens and American citizens is discussed in some detail. Naturally, the internment of Americans of Japanese descent in World War II and the Internal Security Act,4 the Expatriation Act of 1954, 5 the Proclamation of July 1941, providing for
"The Proclaimed List of Certain Blocked Nationals," 6 the severe restrictions designed to prevent the entrance of undesirable aliens into the
United States, the provisions for removing United States citizenship from
persons who "were not attached to the principles of the Constitution at
the time of naturalization," and numerous acts circumscribing the movement of persons, registration of persons, and listing of organizations is
covered in detail. Likewise, the use of riders to appropriation bills pro4 64? Stat. 987, 1013, September 23, 1950, § 25.
5 68 Stat. 1146, 43 U. S. C. § 931 (c), (d) (1958).
655 Stat. 1657, July 17, 1941, § 1 (a), (b).
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viding that no federal funds were to be paid a particular individual or
category of persons has become very common in recent history. In short,
the general attitude of the authors is well summarized when they hold:
It has become an axiom of democratic government that in time of
emergency threatening the health or safety of the community or the
territorial integrity of the nation, the objective of communal survival
takes precedence over the desires and conveniences of the individual.
The energies, wealth, talents of individuals may be conscripted in the
national interest. Democratic governments also have asserted the
right to constrict the range of permissible activities of individuals
whose freedom, if unlimited, is calculated to exacerbate the emergency. Such limitations may apply to the population generally or to
defined segments of it. The intensity of such limitations may be
measured on a continuum ranging from precautionary detention to
the relatively mild requirement that persons in defined categories
register with the government (p. 33).
The authors tend to refrain from taking a strong position either pro
or con as to the exercise of extreme governmental power, rather they are
content to merely let the reader draw his own conclusions, which are
usually very shocking, in the opinion of the reviewer. Viewed in light
of the express purpose of the book, the authors have achieved their objectives in a forthright and direct fashion and have made a real contribution
to the preservation of American freedom and democracy.
Closely allied to individual liberty is the field of "Control of Communications" described in Chapter III. Whereas most legally trained
persons are familiar with the emergency restraints imposed upon individual freedom of speech, considerably less attention is usually devoted
to governmental regulation of entire communication systems. Consequently, the Chapter ".

.

. is limited to a survey and classification of

statutory provisions relating to the withholding and release of information by the government, [and no attempt is made to indicate] .
. to
what extent public opinion has been prejudiced, distorted, or confused
by the federal government's policies concerning the release of information" (p. 73). The Chapter is, therefore, broken down into the following
specific main areas: "The Release of Information By the Government,"
"Regulation of Propaganda Activities," "Censorship," "Acquisition of
Information By the Government," and "Government Investigation."
Surprisingly, in the Chapter on "Judicial Review" extreme criticism
of the United States Supreme Court, on the ground that this highest judi-
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cial body has failed to definitely meet the problem squarely, is offered.
Accordingly:
. . . the Court not only assumes a task for which it is ill-suited but
frequently shirks its responsibilities in the performance thereof. Too
often when it dares to condemn as ultra vires action believed unavoidable in the prosecution of a war, it postpones its invalidation
until after hostilities have terminated. Such post mortem judicial
observations afford most inadequate guides for ascertaining what will
7
be constitutionally permissible in time of crises (p. 126) .
They next consider, in the above mentioned context, the basic issue
as to whether the Constitution is a rigidly restrictive document or, on the
other hand, possesses a flexible character, allowing the Government to
operate under a "constitutional relativity" designed to enable the organs
of government to meet the pressing crisis at the precise moment. Actually,
instances are cited in support of both propositions; thus, the significant
conclusion reached is that the Highest Court in the Nation is not consistent with its own rulings, although-according to Smith and Cotterthe latter position tends to be the most commonly adhered to.
Nevertheless, the sharpest indictment levied against the United States
Supreme Court, and properly so, concerns the inability of most injured
parties-whose rights have been infringed by the Federal Governmentto secure justice in the first instance notwithstanding an even greater
disability to secure effective judicial review before the Highest Tribunal.
In fact, after presenting numerous instances where: 1) no judicial review of any type was secured, 2) the Executive Branch of the Government merely ignored the Supreme Court's ruling, 3) the High Court
refused to question the "political" or "miiary actions" of the other
branches of the Government, or 4) certiorari was denied it is maintained:
the judicial process with its haphazard accretion of cases, the
manifest capacity of government to make cases moot, or failure to
prosecute, frequently makes it impossible for the Court even to review
significant controversies produced by action of the political depart7 Cf. the statement, "The United States Supreme Court, rather than the judicial
system, is popularly-conceived to have a distinctive role to play in checking
arbitrary government in time of emergency, and it endeavors to perform that role.
albeit none too successfully at times by ruling on the constitutionality of the
government power asserted during such period of crisis.
lowever, as the chief
appellate body in a judicial system which as a whole 'handles a mere trickle of
the great issues arising' during an emergency, the Supreme Court cannot reasonably be expected to formulate a coherent theory of democratic response to
emergency whereby action designed to meet the exigencies of war can be harmonized with our constitutional system with only minimum risk to the preservation thereof" (p. 125).
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ments. For every Milligan 8 or Duncan 9 who manages to bring his
case to the Court (usually for post mortem relief), there are hundreds
who submit to abusive governmental action without ever contesting
the validity thereof. This alone affords adequate demonstration that
the court is ineffective in maintaining constitutionalism in time of
war (Emphasis added, p. 133).
The reviewer can only add a "strong second" to the aforementioned
statement because numerous other examples of ineffective judicial review
could be cited. Specifically, it is pointed out that in the case of disputes
involving the abuse of military power or the usurpation of the jurisdiction of military tribunals, the United States Supreme Court has not-in
a single instance-offered the oppressed persons relief until after the
"emergency" had ended; consequently, the long delay in rendering a
final verdict results in effective justice denied.
The remainder of the Chapter is devoted to a splendid discussion of

Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer,10 ".

.

.

for in that decision

are to be found signally important indications of the most effective contribution which the Federal judiciary hereafter may make in sustaining
responsible government" (p. 126). Further, it is believed that the "legal
statesmanship" shown by the Court in this case may serve to indicate a
future path for all of the federal courts.
The book
by Congress;
constitutional
of democratic

concludes with a definite proposal to be--they hope-adopted
in addition, it is finally surmised that "lIt] he doctrine of
dictatorship is inappropriate for analysis of the problem
response to emergency" (p. 144).

Specifically, they
9*. . propose a generic statute to empower the President to proclaim a national or regional emergency. Under such a proclamation
the President may issue rules and regulations which have the force
of law. A proclamation of emergency would be placed before the
Congress within twenty-four hours of its issuance. If Congress were
not in session, it would be called into session within five days from
the time of the declaration of emergency. The proclamation of
emergency would stand unless revoked by concurrent resolution by
both Houses of Congress within five days of Congress' coming into
special session.
8Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2, 1g L. Ed. 281 (1866).
9 Duncan v. Kahanamoku and White v. Steer, 327 U. S. 304, 66 S. Ct. 606, 90
L. Ed. 688 (1946).
10 343 U. S. 579, 72 S. Ct. 863, 98 L. Ed. 1153 (1952).
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The rules and regulations issued under the proclamation would
be similarly subject to revocation by concurrent resolution and Congress should possess the item veto in this respect; i.e., it may revoke
one rule, while permitting other to stand. An emergency proclamation and regulations issued under it, would automatically expire after
thirty days, but would be subject to reissuance by the President,
provided the Congress concurred. Congress, upon the issuance of an
emergency proclamation would establish a scrutiny committee on
emergency powers, patterned after the Joint Committee on Atomic
Energy. Congress would maintain continuous scrutiny of the administration of powers exercised under the proclamation. The Committee's primary responsibility would be to keep Congress sufficiently
advised as to whether powers had been responsibly administered" (p.
144-145).
Therefore, the present mass of disorganized proclamations, statutes, use
of implied or "inherent" powers, joint resolutions, etc., would be replaced
by an all-encompassing federal statute-the authors assume it is constitutional (the reviewer is not quite so certain) -permitting 1) a definite
legally constituted procedure to be followed in all cases of crises, 2) an
iron-clad protection against any unwarranted extension of such power or
unnecessary prolongation of the emergency, and 3) a legislative check or
executive action during the period of crisis.
The final conclusion seems to strike at the heart of the problem when
it is indicated that in any democracy the Chief Executive must possess
great discretionary power; moreover, it must be assumed that he will
exercise this great authority in good faith and not injure or destroy the
institutions he has sworn to uphold.
Today our Nation is facing additional crises that have arisen since
the publication date, such as the export of American stocks of gold; therefore, it is only too evident that one of the main safeguards of our fundamental freedoms lies in the competence and integrity of the President of
the United States because of the vast powers he must of necessity possess
under our constitutional government.
W. PAUL GORM.LEY
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An Anthology of Inspirational and other Helpful
Writings for Members of the Judiciary. Compiled and edited by Donald
K. Carroll. Chicago: American Judicature Society, 1961. Pp. vi, 195.

HANDBOOK FOR JUDGES:

THE LEGAL PROCESS:

An Introduction to Decision-Making by Judicial,

Legislative, Executive, and Administrative Agencies. Carl A. Auerbach,
Lloyd K. Garrison, Willard Hurst and Samuel Mermin. San Francisco:
Chandler Publishing Company, 1961. Pp. xxvii, 915.
For some years the American Judicature Society, welcoming each
new judge to the bench, has presented him or her with a collection of materials designed to familiarize the novitiate with his or her new office.
To this collection can now be added the first of these books, a handsome
volume of inspirational material collected from many diverse sources and
compiled and edited by one who is himself a judge. The publication, so
the author notes, had its origin in an inscription placed on the flyleaf
of the Bible used at the time he took the oath of office. The felicitous
phrase "Do Justice and fear only the Lord" so inscribed triggered the idea
of compiling an anthology which might prove helpful to other judges.
The execution of that concept, while intended to be particularly helpful
to judges, should serve the bar and the public as well for, contained in the
book, is the crystallized essence of the ethical, practical and spiritual experiences of generations of men who, serving as judges or as writers,
have placed emphasis on the concept of government under Law.
Composed as the book is of passages, some brief, some lengthy, from
many different pens, it might be expected that the overall impression, the
one too frequently gathered by any busy reviewer who must run as he
reads, would be a disjointed one. Such, however, is not the case for,
despite an occasional reiteration of an already expressed concept, the
flow of thought is sustained even as it is enriched by the excerpts which
follow one another. For greatest value, of course, each of the many passages included in the anthology should be read singly and savored to the
utmost before another is attempted. If so considered and understood by
every occupant of the judicial chair, the country would then indeed have at
its service a veritable legion of judges who, as Socrates once said, would
"hear courteously, answer wisely, consider soberly, and decide impartially."
The second work, again something of an anthology but not entirely
so, deals with the problems of decision making by the judiciary, but carries
the process over into the legislative, executive and administrative fields. Intended primarily for beginning law students or college upperclassmen,
being those who would most likely seek for an understanding of the
processes and methods traditionally developed and followed by an Anglo-
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American legal system as aids in the development of law and the legal
order, the book is nevertheless worthy of wider attention.
Begun originally by former Dean Garrison and Professor Hurst, under
the title "Law in Society," for use by students at the University of
Wisconsin, the collection has been expanded and revised by Professors
Auerbach and Mermin to the point where it now serves to correlate the
techniques used in all aspects of law making. The core of the work still
centers around one topic, the burden of industrial accidents, as handled
in one state, Wisconsin, but developments elsewhere are not neglected.
Accordingly, the book weaves together the fundamental pattern of a
legal system in operation such as may be found in any American jurisdiction, including, as such a system necessarily does, aspects of history,
sociology, economics, politics and philosophy.
No one could read this collection of materials, actually much longer
than the number of pages would indicate because of the variation in type
sizes, without being both informed about and impressed by all that goes
into the making of a legal doctrine. It is composed of stuff on which a law
student should chew if he wishes to cut and sharpen his eye-teeth.
W. F. ZACHARIAS

